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THE NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL MOOT
COURT ASSOCIATION 27TH ANNUAL
ROBERT F. WAGNER, SR., NATIONAL
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
MOOT COURT COMPETITION
BENCH BRIEF
Jisha S. Vachachira & Stella Yamada
DOCKET NO. 01-58914
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 2002
City Style, Inc.,
Petitioner,
-against-
Carrie S. Bradshaw,
Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO- THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTEENTH CIRCUIT
CONFIDENTIAL
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Docket No. 01-58914
City Style, Inc.,
Petitioner,
-against-
Carrie S. Bradshaw,
Respondent.
The petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourteenth Circuit is hereby granted so that this
Court may hear and consider the following issues:
1. Whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
("ADEA") provides a cause of action based solely on a dispa-
rate impact analysis and whether Respondent has satisfied the
requirements for such a claim for purposes of surviving summary
judgment.
2. Whether "working" is a "major life activity" under Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") and whether
Respondent has satisfied, for purposes of surviving summary
judgment, the requirements for an ADA claim based on a sub-
stantial impairment of her ability to work.
THE FACTS
City Style, a company incorporated in the State of Wagner,
publishes Fashion and the City, a local newspaper that centers on
the fashion, entertainment, and politics of Martini City. Martini
City is the only major city located in the State of Wagner; the near-
est city is approximately 180 miles away. From its founding until
1989, City Style maintained a modest circulation and advertising
base, depending on the season.
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In May 1989, Mr. Big, a renowned businessman, came to Mar-
tini City from New York City to purchase a publishing company.
Mr. Big became the sole owner and Chief Executive Officer of City
Style. Between 1989 and 1998, City Style expanded its news cover-
age, circulation, and advertising base. By the end of 1998, City Style
employed 125 people and returned a profit of $3.3 million for the
fiscal year.
In 1999, the advertising market hit a downturn. At the same
time, a competing weekly newspaper, The Sopranos Edition, lo-
cated 200 miles away, entered the market and diverted a significant
number of advertisers from City Style. By the middle of 1999, Mr.
Big determined that City Style was operating beyond its budget.
Mr. Big decided to change City Style's focus to attract a smaller,
more elite audience. Mr. Big determined that a reduction in force
("RIF") was necessary to implement that goal. Mr. Big set a target
reduction in non-management labor costs at $2.5 million per year.
In his instructions to his senior management staff, Mr. Big imple-
mented a policy in which employees whose salaries over $100,000
annually, or those with unsatisfactory work performance evalua-
tions, were the first considered for layoff. See Appendix A.
Petitioner, Bradshaw, age fifty-one, was laid off because of
City Style's RIF. Bradshaw was a features reporter for City Style.
To uphold Fashion and the City's tradition of being the first to re-
port the newest "do's and don't's," Bradshaw's work day began at
6:00 a.m. Bradshaw also typically worked late at night covering eve-
ning social events, parties, award ceremonies, and other socialite
engagements.
Bradshaw suffered a seizure in June 1999. Dr. Trey MacDou-
gal, a neurologist, diagnosed her as suffering from epilepsy. Epi-
lepsy is a neurological condition that causes unprovoked seizures.
After her diagnosis, Bradshaw began taking Dilantin, a medication
that suppresses seizures by controlling rapidly firing neuronal dis-
charges. Dilantin's side effects include insomnia and drowsiness.
Absent this medication, Bradshaw risks suffering multiple,
debilitating seizures, and possible death. Although other medica-
tions to control seizures were available, Dr. MacDougal determined
that Dilantin was the safest medication for Bradshaw because it
would have the fewest harmful side effects.
Within three months of suffering from the medication's side
effects, Bradshaw realized that she could not keep her rigorous
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schedule. On September 15, 1999, Bradshaw met with her supervi-
sor, Ms. Brady, to request that City Style permit her to begin work
at noon. Bradshaw argued that her nighttime work was more criti-
cal to her column than her early morning work. Ms. Brady advised
Bradshaw to make the request directly to Mr. Big. Later that day,
Bradshaw told Mr. Big that the side effects of her medication were
greatest in the morning. Bradshaw promised that her column would
not suffer and that she would work additional evening hours to
make up any lost time. Before Mr. Big gave Bradshaw an answer,
Bradshaw received notice that City Style had terminated her em-
ployment as part of the RIF.
On October 5, 1999, Mr. Big announced the layoff of twenty-
five employees, effective immediately. The RIF resulted in termi-
nating five employees under the age of forty, of whom three earned
over $100,000 annually and of whom two had records of poor job
performance. In addition, twenty employees over the age of forty
were terminated, of whom seventeen earned over $100,000 annually
and of whom three had records of poor job performance. Before
the RIF, the average age of City Style's employees was thirty-seven.
After the RIF, the average age was thirty-four. Before the RIF, the
average salary of the non-management employees was $76,975. Af-
ter the RIF, the average salary was $63,599.
On January 5, 2000, Bradshaw filed a charge of discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC)
alleging that City Style unjustly terminated her and other similarly
situated individuals based on their age. Bradshaw claimed that City
Style implemented a policy that had an adverse impact on employ-
ees over the age of forty. In addition, Bradshaw alleged that City
Style discharged her because she is a disabled individual substan-
tially limited in the major life activity of working. The EEOC issued
Bradshaw a right-to-sue letter, and she sued in district court.
In her deposition, Bradshaw testified that she had worked for
City Style for sixteen years. Bradshaw is a graduate of Catrall Uni-
versity Journalism School, one of the country's best. Bradshaw as-
serted that she was already a respected fashion reporter when she
began her career with City Style. During her employment at City
Style, Bradshaw's salary and bonuses increased, as did the respect
she received from her peers in the fashion industry. Indeed, Brad-
shaw's column was one of the most read features in Fashion and the
City.
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Bradshaw also testified that she heard rumors that Mr. Big
wanted to discharge twenty-five employees. Bradshaw testified that
she was aware that five individuals who earned over $100,000 would
be unaffected by the RIF because thirty employees earned over
$100,000. Bradshaw testified that she then approached Mr. Big on
or about September 20, 1999. At that time, Bradshaw relayed that
she hoped that her request for the accommodation would not affect
Mr. Big's decision regarding her employment status. Bradshaw
stated that Mr. Big replied that he had to "factor all risks and con-
siderations in making any determination."
Bradshaw further testified that upon her termination she ap-
plied for numerous jobs in the journalism field. Due to her inability
to begin work before noon, however, Bradshaw was unable to find
comparable work in the Martini City area.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 5, 2000, Bradshaw filed a discrimination charge
with the EEOC against City Style. Bradshaw asserted violations
under the ADEA and the ADA based on age and disability. The
EEOC investigated the charge without making a determination and
issued a notice of right-to-sue letter. Bradshaw then sued in the
United States District Court of the Southern District of Wagner,
asserting two counts of employment discrimination. Count one al-
leged a violation of the ADEA. Count two alleged a violation of
the ADA. At the conclusion of discovery, the district court, in an
oral opinion, granted City Style's motion for summary judgment on
both counts. Bradshaw appealed the district court's decision, and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Circuit re-
versed the grant of summary judgment. City Style, Inc. appealed
and this Court granted certiorari.
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967
THE LAW
I. WHETHER DISPARATE IMPACT IS A VIABLE CLAIM
UNDER THE ADEA
To answer the certiorari question, competitors will need to
elicit whether disparate impact theory is viable under the Age Dis-
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crimination in Employment Act of 1967. Congress enacted the
ADEA "to promote employment of older persons based on their
ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of
meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment." 1
Although the ADEA provides for a disparate treatment claim, the
ADEA does not specifically provide for a disparate impact claim.
A disparate impact theory of discrimination is a claim that re-
lies on a facially neutral employment practice or policy, not other-
wise justified by business necessity that has an adverse impact on a
protected class.2 Proof of discriminatory motive is not required
under a disparate impact theory.3 Disparate treatment theory of
discrimination, on the other hand, is a claim in which the employer
simply treats an individual less favorably than others because of a
prohibited classification like age.4 Under disparate treatment, proof
of discriminatory motive is critical.5
There are compelling policy arguments for and against dispa-
rate impact liability in the age discrimination context. Advocates
for older workers argue that older workers need the protection that
the disparate impact theory provides. 6 Advocates for employers ar-
gue that because age is different from race, sex, or national origin,
the disparate impact analysis developed in cases involving race dis-
crimination should not be "imported" into the age discrimination
context. 7 These advocates argue that everyone gets older and that
at some point a correlation arises between age and ability.8
A. Congressional Intent
The ADEA draws its coverage and substantive provisions di-
rectly from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In 1991, Con-
gress amended Title VII to provide for causes of action based on
theories of disparate impact. Courts later reasoned that Congress's
1 29 U.S.C. § 6219(b).
2 Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 See, e.g., Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Im-
pact, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REV. 229, 234
(1990).
7 See, e.g., Pamela S. Krop, Age Discrimination and the Disparate Impact
Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. REV. 837, 838 (1982).
8 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 316 (1996).
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omission of a disparate impact amendment under the ADEA sig-
naled legislative intent to exclude disparate impact liability under
the ADEA.9 However, it is arguable that Congress amended Title
VII only because of the Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Antonio,10 which stiffened the plaintiff's burden of
proof for a disparate impact claim under Title VII. Thus, because
there was no judicial assault on the ADEA, Congress had no rea-
son to amend the ADEA as well.1"
B. Supreme Court Precedent
The Court has noted that "the prohibitions of the ADEA were
derived in haec verba from Title VII. '' 12 Thus, lower courts seeking
to interpret the ADEA's provisions have long looked to Title VII
case law for guidance. However, the Court has implied that dispa-
rate impact claims might not be appropriate under the ADEA.13 In
Hazen Paper, an employer terminated a 62-year-old employee who
was weeks away from vesting under his pension plan.14 The Court
found that the employee's near-vested status motivated the com-
pany to terminate him.' 5 Yet the Court noted that the correlation
between an employee's years of service, to which pension vesting
rights are normally tied, is analytically distinct from the employee's
age.' 6 Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit to consider whether the jury had suffi-
cient evidence of discriminatory treatment to find an ADEA viola-
tion. The Court declared that "disparate treatment was distinct
from disparate impact under the ADEA. 1 7 In his concurring Opin-
ion, Justice Kennedy argued that "there are substantial arguments
that it is improper to carry out disparate impact analysis from Title
VII to the ADEA."' 8
9 See, e.g., Mullen v. Raytheon, 164 F.3d 696, 707 (1st Cir. 1999); EEOC v.
Francis W. Parker School, 41 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994).
10 490 U.S. 642 (1989)
11 See Camacho v. Sears Roebuck de P.R., 939 F. Supp 113, 120 (D. P.R.
1996).
12 Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978).
13 See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
14 Id. at 606.
15 Id. at 609.
16 Id. at 611.
17 Id. at 607.
18 Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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C. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidance
The EEOC's interpretative guidelines for the ADEA provide
that "when an employment practice, including a test, is claimed as a
basis for different treatment of employees or applicants for employ-
ment on the grounds that it is a 'factor other than' age, and such a
practice has an adverse impact on individuals within the protected
age group, it can only be justified as a business necessity." 19 This
guideline suggests that the EEOC supports a disparate impact claim
under the ADEA because it mentions "adverse impact."
When a court reviews an agency's construction of a statute, it
first asks whether Congress has spoken to the question at issue.20 If
Congress has not spoken, or has done so ambiguously, a court may
impose its own construction.21 Rather, the court will uphold the
agency's interpretation if that interpretation is based on a permissi-
ble reading of the statute. 22
It is arguable that although 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) seeks to
transplant disparate impact claims into the ADEA and interpret
the "the reasonable factors other than age" clause to mean "busi-
ness necessity," § 1625.7(d) is only an EEOC policy guideline.2 3
Thus, the force of these guidelines is but a function of their persua-
sive value. 24
II. IF DISPARATE IMPACT IS A VIABLE CLAIM UNDER
THE ADEA
If this Court finds that disparate impact in not a viable claim
under the ADEA, then Respondent, Carrie Bradshaw, cannot
demonstrate that she was discriminated against based on her age.
Conversely, if this Court finds that a disparate impact claim is
viable under the ADEA, Respondent must show the elements of a
prima facie case. The elements of a prima facie case under Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 703(k)(1)(A)(i), are that
(1) the employer uses a particular employment practice;
19 29 C.F.R § 1625.7(d) (emphasis added).
20 See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc, 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984).
21 Id. at 847.
22 Id.
23 See 46 FED. REG. 47,724 (1981) (ADEA guidelines are only statements of
EEOC policy and do not comply with legal requirements for rulemaking).
24 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001) (no Chevron defer-
ence to guidelines); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586 (2000).
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(2) that practice causes an impact;
(3) that impact is sufficient to support a finding that the impact
is disparate;
(4) the impact is adverse to members of the protected group;
and
(5) a protected group suffers the impact.
Statistical techniques may be used to determine whether an
employment policy creates a disparate impact. Supreme Court deci-
sions in disparate impact cases have not involved sophisticated sta-
tistical techniques. Instead, the cases essentially eyeballed the
number to find impact. The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Se-
lection Procedure, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D, adopted by the EEOC, cre-
ate a standard of the impact necessary to trigger enforcement
efforts: "a selection rate ... which is less than four-fifths (or eighty
percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will gener-
ally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence
of adverse impact."
An employer's available defenses under Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 703(h), are that
(1) the employer's practice does not cause an impact on indi-
viduals over forty;
(2) the practice is both job related and justified by business
necessity;
(3) the practice is a test that has been validated using profes-
sional test validation standards;
(4) the practice is a traditional component of a bona fide se-
niority system; or
(5) the practice is a bona fide merit or piecework system.
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
THE LAW
I. WHETHER WORKING IS A MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITY
UNDER THE ADA
The ADA protects a "discrete and insular minority" of 43 mil-
lion substantially limited individuals.25 The ADA provides that "no
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7), (a)(1).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to
job application procedures, the hiring, advancement or discharge of
employees. ' 26 A claimant must be a qualified individual with a disa-
bility to be within the class of individuals the ADA protects.
A qualified individual with a disability is "an individual with a
disability who, with or without a reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that
such individual holds or desires. ' 27 The ADA defines a disability as
"(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record
of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an im-
pairment. ' 28 To determine whether an individual is disabled under
the ADA, a court must first determine whether the condition in
question constitutes a physical or mental impairment. 29 Next, a
court must determine whether a plaintiff's physical or mental im-
pairment substantially limits one or more of her major life activi-
ties. The final step in determining whether an individual is disabled
is to determine whether the plaintiff's impairment results in a sub-
stantial limitation on a major life activity.
The ADA expressly provides that "nothing in this chapter shall
be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied
under Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973." 30 The regulations
implementing the Rehabilitation Act recognize working as a major
life activity.31 Furthermore, EEOC regulations identify major life
activities as "functions such as caring for oneself, performing man-
ual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working. '32 However, the EEOC has expressed reluctance to
define "major life activities" to include working and has suggested
that working be viewed as a residual life activity, considered, as a
last resort, only "if an individual is not substantially limited with
respect to any other major life activity. '33
26 Id. § 12112(a).
27 Id. § 12111(8).
28 Id. § 12102(2).
29 Both sides have stipulated that epilepsy is a physical impairment. Thus,
whether Respondent's condition is a physical or mental impairment is not an issue.
30 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (2000).
31 45 C.F.R. § 84.3()(2)(i)(A) (2001).
32 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (emphasis added).
33 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.20) (1998) (emphasis added).
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A. Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court has explained that major life activities re-
fer to those activities of central importance to most people's daily
lives.34 To date, the Court has not definitively held that working is a
major life activity. In Sutton v. United Airlines, the Court noted the
"conceptual difficulty" of considering working as a major life activ-
ity.35 Specifically, the Court noted that to include working as a ma-
jor life activity seems "to argue in a circle to say that if one is
excluded, for instance, by reason of [an impairment, from working
with others] then the exclusion constitutes an impairment, when the
question ... is, whether the exclusion itself is by reason of handi-
cap."' 36 However, in Sutton, the Court noted that "even assuming
that working is a major life activity, a claimant would be required to
show an inability to work in a 'broad range of jobs,' rather than a
specific job."' 37 Thus, the Court assumed, in Sutton, that working is
a major life activity.
B. EEOC Guidance
The EEOC regulations identify major life activities as "func-
tions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. '38
However, the EEOC has suggested that working be viewed as a
residual life activity, considered, as a last resort, only "if an individ-
ual is not substantially limited with respect to any other major life
activity. '39 The Court has observed that "no agency [has] been
given authority to issue regulations implementing the generally ap-
plicable provisions of the ADA. and that no agency has been dele-
gated authority to interpret the term 'disability.' '"40 Thus, it is
arguable that the EEOC's regulation defining "major life activities"
to include "working" is not entitled to deference under Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,41 because the
EEOC had no authority to promulgate it.42
34 See Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196 (2002).
35 527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999).
36 Id. at 492.
37 Id.
38 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (emphasis added).
39 Id. § 1630.2() (emphasis added).
40 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479.
41 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984),
42 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237 (2001).
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II. IF WORKING IS A MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITY, DEMONSTRATING
SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATION
If this Court holds that working is a major life activity, the stat-
utory phrase "substantially limits [will] require . . . that plaintiffs
allege that they are unable to work in a broad class of jobs.43 ER-
ROR! UNKNOWN SWITCH ARGUMENT.To be substantially limited in
the major life activity of working, a person must be precluded from
more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of
choice. 44 If a job uses an individual's skills but no unique talents,
then the individual is not precluded from performing in a substan-
tial class of jobs.45 Similarly, if different types of jobs are available,
the individual is not precluded from a broad range of jobs.
The EEOC has identified several factors that courts should
consider to determine whether an individual is substantially limited
in the major life activity of working. These factors include the geo-
graphical area to which the individual has reasonable access and
"the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge,
skills, or abilities, within the geographical area, from which the indi-
vidual is also disqualified. '46
The EEOC also provides several factors to determine whether
a person is substantially limited in a major life activity: (1) the na-
ture and severity of the impairment; (2) the duration or expected
duration of the impairment; and (3) the permanent or long-term
impact or the expected permanent or long-term impact resulting
from the impairment. 47
ORAL ARGUMENT SPEAKER DESIGNATIONS
Petitioner (Speakers 1 and 2) represents City Style, Inc.
Respondent (Speakers 3 and 4) represents Carrie S. Bradshaw.
PETITIONER 1: CITY STYLE, INC.
ARGUMENT
Petitioner 1 represents City Style, Inc, the employer. Petitioner
1 should begin by arguing that a disparate impact claim is not viable
43 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491; accord Toyota, 534 U.S. at 190.
44 See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 190.
45 See id.
46 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A)(B).
47 Id. § 1630.20)(2).
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under Supreme Court precedent. Petitioner 1 will point to the Su-
preme Court's decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins.48 The Court
in Hazen Paper held that legitimate business decisions indirectly
correlated with age do not violate the ADEA under a disparate
treatment theory of discrimination.49 Petitioner 1 may further argue
that the Court's ruling in County of Washington v. Gunther,50 in
which the Court held that disparate impact claims are unavailable
under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C § 206(d), which is similar to the
ADEA, also supports the principle that disparate impact claims are
not viable under the ADEA.
Petitioner 1 may note that several circuits have also held that
disparate impact is not a viable claim under the ADEA.5 1 Peti-
tioner 1 should also argue that the plain language and legislative
history of the ADEA confirm that disparate impact claims contra-
vene Congress's intent. As a public policy argument, Petitioner 1
one should argue that disparate impact analysis is fundamentally
unsuitable for ADEA cases because of the difficulties employers
faced. For example, it may be difficult for an employer to monitor
every conceivable age disparity because age is a constantly evolving
personal characteristic.
Petitioner 1 should argue that even if this Court finds that dis-
parate impact is a viable claim, City Style's reduction-in-force
("RIF") was based on the nondiscriminatory basis of salary because
it simply terminated employees for budgetary reasons. Absent in-
tent to discriminate based on age, there should be no violation.
Under Title VII, an employer has five defenses to rebut a plainitff's
prima facie case of disparate impact. Petitioner 1 should argue that
the RIF was job related and justified by business necessity. Peti-
tioner 1 should argue that the RIF was an across-the-board cut and,
as a result, that the adverse impact on older workers is unavoidable.
It is impossible to reduce wage costs without affecting the older
workers because, by virtue of being older, they have greater
salaries.
48 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
49 Id. at 609.
50 452 U.S. 161 (1981)
51 See Evers v. Alliant Techsys., Inc., 241 F.3d 948, 953 (8th Cir. 2001); Cole-
man v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1281 (9th Cir. 2000); cf. Mullin v. Ray-
theon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 700 (1st Cir. 1999); Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d
999, 1007 (10th Cir. 1996).
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QUESTIONS
Questions and possible answers about the viability of disparate im-
pact under the ADEA
1. Haven't we held that Title VII and the ADEA are closely aligned?
So if disparate impact is available under Title VII, why not under
the ADEA?
Although this Court has held that Title VII and the ADEA are
closely aligned, this Court in Hazen Paper held that legitimate
business decisions indirectly correlated with age do not violate
the ADEA under a disparate treatment theory of discrimination.
2. Shouldn't we be deferential to the EEOC's decision to interpret
the ADEA to allow disparate impact claims?
Yes. The EEOC provides a disparate impact claim under the
ADEA. However, although this Court has held that EEOC is
entitled to Chevron deference, the deference is not absolute
when EEOC's interpretation conflicts with the ADEA's plain
meaning.
3. Didn't City Style's Reduction in Force adversely affect the em-
ployees over the age of 40, thereby violating the ADEA's prohibi-
tion on age discrimination?
No. City Style faced financial difficulties when a competing
weekly newspaper diverted a significant number of advertisers
from City Style. Thus, Mr. Big, the CEO and the owner of City
Style, determined that a RIF was necessary for financial reasons.
Business necessity is a reasonable factor other than age under
the ADEA.
4. How does construing the ADEA illustrate that disparate impact is
not a viable claim under the ADEA?
In Hazen Paper, this Court held that the ADEA's plain lan-
guage, purpose, and legislative history indicate that Congress en-
acted the ADEA to prevent intentional age-based employment
discrimination, not employment decisions practices based on fac-
tors "analytically distinct" from age, even when these factors
may be "correlated with age."
5. If we allow a disparate impact claim under the ADEA, do you
lose?
No. Even if this Court finds that disparate impact is a viable
claim, the RIF was a reasonable factor other than age for which
City Style terminated Bradshaw.
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Questions and possible answers about whether Respondent demon-
strates discrimination through disparate impact
1. If we find that disparate impact is a viable claim under the ADEA,
what possible rebuttals does City Style have?
Under section 4 of the ADEA, an employer may take any action
prohibited under the Act if differentiation is based on reasona-
ble factors other than age.
2. Doesn't the statistical disparity between the employees over and
under the age of 40 years of age negatively affect your case?
Although a statistical disparity exists between the employees
over and under the age of 40 under City Style's RIF, that dispar-
ity merely correlates with the high salaries of the employees.
3. Since Mr. Big's Memo provides he wanted to reduce $2.5 million
from the operating budget but the RIF actually cut more than $3.2
million, couldn't City Style use an alternative employment practice
to reduce costs rather than terminate individuals who made over
$100,000?
4. What statistical anomaly is sufficient to state a prima facie cause of
action?
The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedure, 29
C.F.R. § 1607.4D, adopted by the EEOC, create a standard of
the impact necessary to trigger enforcement efforts: "a selection
rate ... which is less than four-fifths (or eighty percent) of the
rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be re-
garded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of ad-
verse impact."
5. By recognizing a statistical cause of action, aren't we relegating
this case to a battle of the experts at trial?
6. Are statistical disparities alone sufficient to assert a cause of action
under Title VII? Should statistical disparity alone be sufficient to
assert a cause of action under the ADEA?
Statistical disparities alone are not sufficient. However, statistics
can be used to determine whether an employment policy creates
disparate impact. Two circuits have required studies showing sta-
tistical significance to make out a prima facie case of disparate
impact.52
52 See Thomas v. Metroflight, Inc., 814 F.2d 1506, 1507 (10th Cir. 1987);
Fudge v. City of Providence Fire Dep't, 766 F.2d 650, 658 (1st Cir. 1985).
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7. If we find that Bradshaw succeeds on the merits on her disparate
impact claim, are the members of a class of employees similarly
situated to Bradshaw entitled to relief as well?
Yes. Members of the class of employees affected by City Style's
systemic discrimination are presumptively entitled to relief. City
Style can avoid liability to each individual in the class by proving
that it had not discriminated against the individual.
PETITIONER 2: CITY STYLE, INC.
ARGUMENT
Petitioner 2 addresses the ADA issue. Petitioner 2 has a two-
part argument. First, Petitioner 2 should argue that working is not a
major life activity under the ADA. The ADA does not define
whether working constitutes a major life activity. Although the
EEOC lists working as a major life activity, Petitioner 2 may rebut
that by saying that the EEOC lacks congressional authority to de-
fine working as a major life activity.53 Petitioner 2 may contend that
an over-expansive reading of the protected class ("qualified individ-
uals with a disability") would compromise the rights the ADA cre-
ated for those truly in need of statutory protection. Petitioner 2
should observe that when the ADA was created, Congress found
that approximately forty-three million Americans have one or more
physical or mental disabilities.54 Thus, Congress would have noted a
larger number of disabled individuals if it had in mind that working
is a major life activity.
Second, Petitioner 2 should argue that even if working is a ma-
jor life activity, Bradshaw submitted no evidence to place at issue
her inability to work. A claimant must be a qualified individual with
a disability to be within the class of individuals the ADA protects.
Thus, Petitioner 2 should argue that Bradshaw is not a qualified
individual with a disability by providing the definition of a "disabil-
ity." In addition, Petitioner 2 should argue that Bradshaw's epilepsy
does not substantially limit her in the major life activity of working.
Petitioner 2 should discuss the nature and severity of the impair-
53 See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984) (finding that if statute is silent with respect to specific issue, question for
court is whether agency's answer is based on permissible construction of statute
based on congressional intent.)
54 42 U.S.C. 12101(a).
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ment and the duration or expected duration of the impairment. Pe-
titioner 2 should also discuss the permanent or long-term impact
resulting from the impairment. Petitioner 2 may note that the ma-
jority of courts that construe "disability" rarely find that the indi-
vidual is substantially limited in the major life activity of working.55
QUESTIONS
Questions and possible answers about whether working is a major
life activity under the ADA
1. Hasn't this Court in Sutton already assumed that working is a ma-
jor life activity?
This Court assumed working was a major life activity in Sutton.
However, this Court also noted it did not decide whether work-
ing is a major life activity. Further, this Court has found that
there may be some conceptual difficulty in analyzing "working"
as a major life activity. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 200.
2. Wouldn't a narrow reading of the protected class, a qualified indi-
vidual with a disability, compromise the rights the ADA created
for those disabled individuals in need of statutory protection?
No. A narrow reading would protect those truly in need of statu-
tory protection. Congress did not intent to cover all disabled in-
dividuals. Instead, when it enacted the ADA, Congress limited
disabled individuals to those who are "qualified individuals with
a disability. '56
3. Say we decide that working is a major life activity. Do you lose?
No. Even if this Court finds that working is a major life activity,
Bradshaw has not proven that she is substantially limited in the
major life activity of working, given that she is not substantially
limited in a broad class of jobs.
Questions and possible answers about whether Bradshaw is substan-
tially limited in the major life activity of working
55 See, e.g., Doren v. Battle Creek Health Sys., 187 F.3d 595, 598 (6th Cir.
1999) (finding that pediatric nurse's impairment does not substantially limit her in
working because she presented no evidence concerning number of pediatric nurs-
ing jobs from which she was excluded); Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 331
(5th Cir. 1996) (holding that firefighter's inability to work is not substantial limita-
tion on major life activity of working because firefighting does not constitute a
"class of jobs.")
56 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2002)
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1. The ADA requires that employers provide reasonable accommo-
dation to individuals with disabilities unless doing so would im-
pose and "undue hardship" on the employer's business. Did City
Style provide for a reasonable accommodation?
No. Bradshaw was affected by City Style's Reduction in Force in
October 1999 before Mr. Big could make a decision about
accommodation.
2. Wouldn't it make sense to view "working" as referring to those
jobs that Bradshaw has demonstrated a capacity for or an interest
in?
No. To be substantially limited in the major life activity of work-
ing, a person must be precluded from more than one type of job,
a specialized job, or a particular job of choice.5 7 Even if a job
uses an individual's skills but no unique talents, then the individ-
ual is not precluded from performing in a substantial class of
jobs. If different types of jobs are available, the individual is not
precluded from a broad range of jobs.58
3. EEOC regulations provide several factors that courts should con-
sider if "working" is the major life activity in question. How is
Bradshaw not substantially limited when considering these
factors?
The determination whether an impairment substantially limits a
major life activity depends on the nature and severity of the im-
pairment, the duration or expected duration of the impairment,
and the permanent or long-term impact of the impairment. In
addition, an impairment substantially limits an individual's abil-
ity to work if it prevents or significantly restricts the individual
from performing a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in vari-
ous classes.
Here, there is no evidence that Bradshaw's epileptic seizures will
have a long-term impact. In addition, she is not restricted from
performing other jobs in journalism. She can teach journalism
classes in the evenings or choose a career related to journalism
that requires evening hours.
4. Bradshaw testified that upon termination she applied for numer-
ous jobs in the field of journalism, but due to her inability to work
before noon, she was unable to find comparable work in the Mar-
tini City area. Doesn't Bradshaw's inability to work substantially
57 Toyota, 534 U.S. at 190; Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491.
58 Toyota, 534 U.S. at 190.
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limit her ability to work in a broad class of jobs, especially be-
cause the nearest city is 180 miles away?
No. The EEOC promulgated several factors that courts should
consider when determining whether an individual is substantially
limited in the major life activity of working, including the geo-
graphical area to which the individual has reasonable access and
the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowl-
edge, skills, or abilities, within the geographical area, from which
the individual is also disqualified. 59 However, the position of fea-
tures reporter is a single, particular job, and a limitation on a
single, particular job cannot constitute a substantial limitation on
the major life activity of working.
5. Under the Longshore Harbor Workers and Compensation Act,
courts routinely look at jobs in the community for which someone
is eligible for after suffering an injury. Is that about the same ap-
proach we should use in these kinds of cases?
6. Would Bradshaw be substantially limited in the major life activity
of working if she had applied for Social Security Disability Insur-
ance ("SSDI") after City Style terminated her?
No. SSDI and the ADA serve different purposes and use differ-
ent approaches to assess whether a person can work. Therefore,
it is possible for a person to be eligible for SSDI and also fail to
meet the ADA's definition of "qualified individual with a
disability. ' '60
7. Doesn't Bradshaw's medication have potentially debilitating side
effects?
No. Although Dilantin's side effects include insomnia and drow-
siness, Bradshaw has not put in issue the long-term or permanent
effects of the medication.
8. Would it make a difference if Bradshaw applied for a position
with the Soprano's Edition and was offered a position there?
Would the 180-mile distance from the next major town determine
whether that was the only comparable position available?
Yes. It would make a difference if she was offered a position
with the Soprano's Edition. It demonstrates that Bradshaw is not
substantially limited in the major life activity of working because
59 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3).
60 Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999) (finding that
receipt of SSDI benefits does not automatically bar plaintiff from maintaining an
ADA action).
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there exists a comparable job using her training, knowledge,
skills, or abilities within the geographical area. In addition, geo-
graphical area is one factor to determine whether a person is
substantially limited in the major life activity of working. How-
ever, a claimant must still prove that she is limited in a broad
range of jobs.
RESPONDENT 1: CARRIE BRADSHAW
ARGUMENT
Respondent 1 represents Carrie S.'Bradshaw. Respondent 1
should begin by arguing that disparate impact is a viable theory
under the ADEA. The Supreme Court has noted that Title VII and
the ADEA are closely aligned and have similar purposes.61 Re-
spondent 1 should argue, however, that Congress failed to amend
the ADEA when it amended the Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts
in 1991 to provide for a disparate impact claim. Respondent 1
should also note that until the concurrence in Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggens, the lower courts agreed, almost unanimously, that dispa-
rate impact analysis applied under the ADEA.62
Respondent 1 should further argue that because the ADEA
prohibitions track the language of Title VII, disparate impact claims
comport with Congress's intent to achieve broad-based equality of
employment opportunities. In rebutting the assertion that Congress
did not intend for disparate impact claims under the ADEA by fail-
ing to amend the ADEA to comport Title VII, Respondent 2 may
note that congressional inaction gives rise to more than one infer-
ence. An inference may be drawn that Congress did not include
disparate impact claims because it assumed that the doctrine al-
ready applied to the ADEA.
Further, Respondent 1 will argue that EEOC regulation 29
C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) adopts the disparate impact principle for the
ADEA and, therefore, that this Court should adopt EEOC's inter-
pretation. In Chevron, the Court accorded considerable weight to
an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme if
61 See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756-758 (1979); Lorillard
v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978).
62 507 U.S. 604, 618 (1993).
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Congress entrusted the executive department to administer the
statute.6
3
QUESTIONS
Questions and possible answers about whether disparate impact is a
viable claim under the ADEA
1. How does the ADEA correlate with Title VIi?
Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967, three years after it enacted
Title VII. Section 703 of Title VII is identical to section 4 of the
ADEA. This demonstrates that, by adopting in 1967 the same
language it used in Title VII, Congress manifested its intent to
extend to older workers the same protection against discrimina-
tion extended to groups protected by Title VII.
2. Doesn't the requirement of proof that age played a determining
role in the employer's decision-making process capture the essence
of what Congress sought to prohibit under the ADEA?
Not exactly. Congress's purpose in enacting the ADEA was to
promote employment of older persons based on their ability
rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in em-
ployment; and to help employers and workers find ways of meet-
ing problems arising from the impact of age on employment. 64
3. How does interpreting the ADEA support your position that dis-
parate impact is a viable claim under the ADEA?
The ADEA's prohibitions broadly define "discrimination" by
tracking the language of Title VII. As such, the ADEA, like Title
VII, permits proof of discrimination using the theory of dispa-
rate impact.
4. Why should this Court defer to the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission on this important question of law?
The EEOC is entitled to Chevron deference because it is the
expert agency in interpreting and enforcing employment discrim-
ination statutes. 65 The EEOC has substantive rule-making power
under the ADEA, and it has adopted through its guidelines that
a disparate impact claim is viable under the ADEA by regula-
tion after notice and comment.66
63 467 U.S. at 844.
64 29 U.S.C. § 621(b).
65 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
66 See id.
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5. Isn't it a slippery slope to recognize disparate impact theory under
the ADEA? What's the limiting principle?
Questions and possible answers about whether Bradshaw demon-
strates discrimination through disparate impact
1. Why should we allow Bradshaw to bring a disparate impact claim
rather than a disparate treatment claim against City Style?
A less drastic level of impact is necessary to make out a dispa-
rate impact case to prove that City Style's use of the RIF was the
product of discriminatory intent. Under disparate treatment,
Bradshaw must demonstrate a gross and long-lasting disparity to
draw the inference of intent to discriminate in a systemic dispa-
rate-treatment case.
2. How could City Style have achieved its cost-reductions without
running afoul of the ADEA? What do you suggest as an alterna-
tive employment practice to reduce costs for City Style?
3. What's the statistical disparity in this case?
Depending on the competitors' statistical formula, the specific
numbers may vary. Nonetheless, the competitors should indicate
that eighty percent of the employees affected by the RIF were
over the age of forty.
4. How much evidence of a statistical disparity is necessary to prove
that City Style's RIF violates the ADEA?
The EEOC's Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Proce-
dures adopts a "four-fifths rule" in which a selection rate which
is less than four-fifths (or eighty percent) of the rate for the
group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by the fed-
eral enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact. 67
5. How has City Style violated the ADEA when Mr. Big's memoran-
dum simply identifies a neutral business practice?
Disparate impact discrimination is the unjustified use by an em-
ployer of practices that, although neutral on their face, neverthe-
less heavily burden a protected class. Here, City Style's directive,
though neutral on its face, had a disparate impact on individuals
over the age of forty.
6. How can there be a violation of the ADEA when City Style's busi-
ness practice will per se automatically affect older employees more
often than younger employees?
67 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D
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In many instances, salary correlates with age. Disparate impact
claims protects employees from covert discrimination by their
employers. However, once a plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie
case that a facially neutral practice has a disparate impact on
older workers, the burden than shifts to the defendant to prove
that the challenged practice is job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity.
RESPONDENT 2: CARRIE BRADSHAW
ARGUMENT
Respondent 2 also represents Carrie S. Bradshaw. Respondent
2 addresses the ADA issue. Respondent 2 should begin by arguing
that working is a major life activity under the ADA.68 In Sutton, the
Court noted that even assuming that working is a major life activity;
a claimant would be required to show an inability to work in a
"broad range of jobs" rather than a specific job.69 Thus, Respon-
dent 2 should note that the Court assumed working is a major life
activity.
Respondent 2 should state that circuit courts have found indi-
viduals substantially limited in the major life activity of working;
thus these opinions assumed that working is a major life activity.
Respondent 2 should also point to the EEOC's guidance in listing
"working" as an acceptable major life activity. Respondent 2 should
be able to explain why the Court should defer to the EEOC's
guidelines on this issue.
Respondent 2 should further assert that Bradshaw is substan-
tially limited in the major life activity of working. Respondent 2
should argue that Bradshaw is a qualified individual under the
ADA. Respondent should provide the definition of disability. Fur-
ther, Respondent 2 should argue that Bradshaw is substantially lim-
ited in the major life activity of working by showing that she is
unable to work in a broad class of jobs. Respondent 2 should articu-
late that Bradshaw's medication, while limiting the risk of debilitat-
ing seizures, still causes severe side effects such as insomnia and
drowsiness. Respondent 2 should also point out that Bradshaw ap-
plied for numerous jobs in the journalism field but, due to her in-
68 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
69 527 U.S. 479 at 492.
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ability to begin work before noon, was unable to find a position in
the Martini City Area.
QUESTIONS
Questions and possible answers about whether working is a major
life activity under the ADA
1. Does this Court's holding in Sutton negatively affect your case?
No. This Court did not decide whether working is a major life
activity under the ADA. However, this Court did assume that
working is a major life activity. In addition, the facts of Sutton
are distinguishable from the instant case. In Sutton, the plaintiffs
alleged only that the employer regarded their poor vision as pre-
cluding them from holding positions as a "global airline pilot."
The Court held that because the position of global airline pilot is
a single job, the allegation did not support the claim that the
defendant regarded the plaintiffs as having a substantially limit-
ing impairment.70 Here, Bradshaw applied for numerous jobs in
the journalism field without success due to her inability to start
work before noon.
2. Isn't true that no agency has been authorized to define the term
"disability" as the term is used in the ADA?
Yes. However, the EEOC has issued regulations to define disa-
bilities and major life activities like working. In addition, in Sut-
ton this Court assumed that the EEOC's regulations interpreting
substantial limitations with respect to major life activities were
reasonable. 71
3. How have courts, post-Sutton, construed a "class of jobs" in de-
termining whether a person is substantially limited in the major
life activity of working?
Several circuits have required a broad class of jobs and have fre-
quently rejected plaintiff's proposed classes of jobs as too
narrow.
72
70 Id. at 493 (emphasis in original).
71 Id. at 492.
72 See Witter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 138 F.3d 1366, 1370-71 (11th Cir. 1998);
see also Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 334-36 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that
firefighter's inability to work is not substantial limitation on major life activity of
working because fire-fighting does not constitute "class of jobs").
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4. What if any changes did the EEOC make to its Interpretive Gui-
dance after this Court's holding in Sutton with respect to mitigat-
ing measures?
Before this Court's ruling in Sutton, the EEOC's regulations
provided that mitigating measures should not be considered
when determining whether someone has an ADA "disability."
This guidance is no longer effective after the Supreme Court's
rulings in Sutton and Murphy. However, the EEOC regulations
allow a person to be substantially limited in the major life activ-
ity of working if the mitigating measures cause side effects.
5. If we find that working is a major life activity under the ADA,
wouldn't that open the flood gates to litigation?
No. Consistent with EEOC's position, determining whether a
person has a "disability" must be made on a case-by-case basis.
Questions and possible answers about whether Bradhsaw is substan-
tially limited in the major life activity if working
1. How is a person substantially limited in the major life activity of
working?
With respect to the major life activity of working, the EEOC has
defined "substantially limited" as being significantly restricted in
the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of
jobs in various classes as compared to average persons having
comparable training, skills, and abilities. The inability to perform
a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limita-
tion on the major life activity of working.
2. What must Bradshaw show to establish that she, is qualified per-
son with a disability?
Bradshaw must show that she can perform the essential func-
tions of a reporter "with or without reasonable accommodation."
In this case, the accommodation would be an altered work
schedule.
3. What are "mitigating measures" when determining whether a per-
son is a qualified individual with a disability?
Mitigating measures are medications and assistive devices that
eliminate or reduce the effects of impairments. Examples of mit-
igating measures include medication for conditions like epilepsy
or major depression; insulin-to control diabetes; prosthetic de-
vices; walkers, canes, and crutches; and hearing aids.
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4. Does Sutton and the changes to EEOC's Interpretive Guidance as
a result of Sutton mean that because Bradshaw uses Dilantin to
suppress her seizures, she is not protected under the ADA?
No. The Supreme Court's decision in Sutton emphasized that
whether a particular individual has an ADA "disability" must be
determined on a case-by-case basis. That a person uses a mitigat-
ing measure does not necessarily mean that the person cannot
meet one of the ADA's three definitions of "disability." A per-
son may still experience substantial limitation in performing a
major life activity despite, or because of, the use of a mitigating
measure.
5. Do you lose if we find that working is not a major life activity
because of Bradshaw's use of Dilantin as a mitigating measure?
No. Individuals who use mitigating measures and, as a result, are
not substantially limited in performing a major life activity may
meet one of the ADA's other definitions of "disability." A per-
son may have a record of a disability (e.g., being substantially
limited in the past), or an employer may regard the person as
having a disability (e.g., the employer perceives the person as
being substantially limited in performing a major life activity).
6. If we allow side effects from medications to constitute a disability,
are we descending on a slippery slope?
No. Even if this Court allows side effects to constitute a disabil-
ity, a plaintiff maintains the burden to demonstrate that the side
effect from the medication substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities.
7. Since Bradshaw was laid off based on her salary level, rather than
her disability, doesn't that negate any inference that she was dis-
criminated against based on disability?
No. A person can have a valid ADEA discrimination claim
along with a valid ADA claim. Both employment laws require
different analysis and burdens of proof.
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APPENDIX A
CITY STYLE, INC.
29 Yamada Avenue
The Vachachira Building
Martini City, Wagner 10013
Tel: (212) 867-5309 / Fax: (212) 867-6969
MEMORANDUM
TO: Senior Management Staff
FROM: Mr. Big
DATE: September 15, 1999
RE: Decision to Downsize
All employees are considered valuable and indispensable at City
Style. However, due to budgetary constraints, a reduction in force is
necessary for the continued success of City Style.
The non-management labor budget must be reduced by at least $2.5
million. Thus, approximately 25 employees will be terminated
based on their current salaries. Please give me a list of the 30 indi-
viduals whose current salaries and benefit packages exceed
$100,000 annually, along with their past 6 performance evaluations.
Of the highest paid staff members, those with poor work histories
will be laid off first. The remaining reductions will be based on sal-
ary, save the best performers.
I believe that this decision will best effectuate the goal of operating
City Style efficiently. The RIF will take place on October 5, 1999.
//MB
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APPENDIX B
THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
ACT OF 1967
29 U.S.C. § 623(a). Prohibition of age discrimination
(a) Employer practices. It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or other-
wise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply
with this Act.
29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). Prohibition of age discrimination
(f) Lawful practices; age an occupational qualification; other rea-
sonable factors; seniority system; employee benefit plans; discharge
or discipline for good cause. It shall not be unlawful for an em-
ployer, employment agency, or labor organization-
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsections (a),
(b), (c), or (e) of this section where age is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business, or where the differentiation is based on reason-
able factors other than age, or where such practices involve an em-
ployee in a workplace in a foreign country, and compliance with
such subsections would cause such employer, or a corporation con-
trolled by such employer, to violate the laws of the country in which
such workplace is located;
29 U.S.C. § 631. Age limits
(a) Individuals at least 40 years of age. The prohibitions in this Act
shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age.
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APPENDIX C
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
42 U.S.C. § 12101.
b) Purpose. It is the purpose of this Act-
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards ad-
dressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in
enforcing the standards established in this Act on behalf of individ-
uals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate com-
merce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced
day-to-day by people with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12102.
(2) Disability. The term "disability" means, with respect to an indi-
vidual-
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
(8) Qualified individual with a disability. The term "qualified indi-
vidual with a disability" means an individual with a disability who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essen-
tial functions of the employment position that such individual holds
or desires. For the purposes of this title, consideration shall be given
to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essen-
tial, and if an employer has prepared a written description before
advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description
shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.
42 U.S.C. § 12112.
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(a) General rule. No covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of
such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.
